Voting behavior in Indonesia from 1999 to 2014 : religious cleavage or economic performance? by Higashikata Takayuki & Kawamura Koichi
Voting behavior in Indonesia from 1999 to 2014
: religious cleavage or economic performance?
著者 Higashikata Takayuki, Kawamura Koichi
権利 Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア
経済研究所 / Institute of Developing
Economies, Japan External Trade Organization
(IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp
journal or
publication title
IDE Discussion Paper
volume 512
year 2015-03-01
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2344/1422
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
  
IDE Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated  
to stimulate discussions and critical comments 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: election, political party, voting behavior, electoral volatility, effective 
number of parties, religious cleavage voting, retrospective economic voting, Indonesia 
JEL classification: D72 
  
* Researcher, Southeast Asian Studies Group I, Area Studies Center (takayuki_higashikata@ide.go.jp)  
+ Researcher, Southeast Asian Studies Group I, Area Studies Center (koichi_kawamura@ide.go.jp) 
IDE DISCUSSION PAPER No. 512 
 
Voting Behavior in Indonesia from 1999 to 2014 
 
Religious Cleavage or Economic Performance? 
 
Takayuki HIGASHIKATA* and Koichi KAWAMURA+ 
 
March 2015 
Abstract  
In this study, we examine the voting behavior in Indonesian parliamentary elections 
from 1999 to 2014. After summarizing the changes in Indonesian parties’ share of the 
vote from a historical standpoint, we investigate the voting behavior with simple 
regression models to analyze the effect of regional characteristics on Islamic/secular 
parties’ vote share, using aggregated panel data at the district level. Then, we also test 
the hypothesis of retrospective economic voting. The results show that districts 
which formerly stood strongly behind Islamic parties continued to select those 
parties, or gave preference to abstention over the parties in some elections. From the 
point of view of retrospective economic voting, we found that districts which 
experienced higher per capita economic growth gave more support to the ruling 
parties, although our results remain tentative because information on 2014 is not yet 
available. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) is a semigovernmental, 
nonpartisan, nonprofit research institute, founded in 1958. The Institute 
merged with the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) on July 1, 1998.  
The Institute conducts basic and comprehensive studies on economic and 
related affairs in all developing countries and regions, including Asia, the 
Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Oceania, and Eastern Europe. 
 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).  Publication does 
not imply endorsement by the Institute of Developing Economies of any of the views 
expressed within. 
 
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (IDE), JETRO 
3-2-2, WAKABA, MIHAMA-KU, CHIBA-SHI 
CHIBA 261-8545, JAPAN 
 
©2015 by Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO 
No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the 
IDE-JETRO. 
 1 
Voting Behavior in Indonesia from 1999 to 2014 
Religious Cleavage or Economic Performance? 
Takayuki Higashikata

 and Koichi Kawamura

 
 
Abstract 
In this study, we examine the voting behavior in Indonesian parliamentary elections from 
1999 to 2014. After summarizing the changes in Indonesian parties’ share of the vote 
from a historical standpoint, we investigate the voting behavior with simple regression 
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 2 
Introduction 
After the fall of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime, Indonesia experienced four 
general elections and three presidential elections between 1999 and 2014. All elections 
were held relatively fairly and peacefully, and both winners and losers accepted the final 
polling counts, resulting in peaceful power transitions. Because of its peaceful 
consecutive elections, Indonesia has been praised by the international community as an 
example of successful democratization as well as stability.   
However, the steadiness of Indonesia’s democratic regime does not mean that 
electoral results are stable. No party has ever won the first in a series of elections and 
acquired a majority in the House of People’s Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat: DPR).
1
 Because polling results fluctuated every time elections were held, the 
composition of the legislature has changed drastically. 
If we look back at Indonesian politics under the parliamentary democracy of 
the 1950s, it used to be understood that political parties, whose constituents were split by 
socio-religious cleavages between secularism and Islam, competed against one another 
for political power. According to Feith (1957), such electoral divisions in the 1950s gave 
birth to the four major parties representing particular social strata. They were the secular 
nationalistic Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia: PNI), the traditional 
Islamic Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the modern Islamic Masyumi, and the leftist Indonesian 
Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia: PKI). The party system based on 
Indonesian socio-religious cleavages was defined as “aliran politics.”   
However, since the democratization in 1998, the Indonesian party system has 
                                                        
1
 This paper focuses on the general elections of the House of People’s Representative (DPR), the lower 
chamber, and it does not deal with those of the House of Local Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan 
Daerah: DPD), the upper chamber. Here, “the parliament” refers to the DPR unless specifically stated 
otherwise. 
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never been fixed. Elections in the post-democratization period have been characterized by 
fluctuations and volatility. Such fluctuations in electoral results and the volatility of 
electoral behavior cannot be explained by the conventional view that support of parties 
by the electorate is based on traditional social cleavages. So, in this paper, we analyze 
whether religious cleavage,
2
 among other social cleavages, has any power to explain the 
voting behavior in Indonesia, and then we examine the cause of the fluctuations in the 
vote share.  
The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, religious cleavage still 
strongly leads much of the electorate to consistently select the Islamic or secular parties. 
Second, we point out that retrospective economic voting has been observed in Indonesia 
as in other countries.
3
 Moreover, this may be one of the reasons why the vote share has 
fluctuated from time to time. Although certain events before elections, such as media 
coverage of the ruling party politicians’ involvement in a corruption case, seem to be 
influential enough for the electorate to punish the ruling party, the electorate consistently 
looks at the regional economic condition they face; that is, if the regional economic 
condition is good, they tend to vote for the incumbent parties and vice versa.  
This study is organized as follows. In section 1, we review the national trends 
in electoral results through analysis of electoral volatility and the effective number of 
parties; in section 2, we confirm the religious cleavage in Indonesia through simple 
statistical/quantitative analysis using regional (kabupaten/Kota) level data on the absolute 
                                                        
2
 In this paper we use the term religious cleavage in order to consider the differences of voting 
behavior between the devoted Muslim and the secular including the nominal Muslim and other 
religious minorities as pointed out by Esmer and Pettersson (2007). They emphasize the importance of 
analyzing the differences of voting behavior between the non-secular and the secular, rather than 
between different religions. 
3
 Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2007) summarize literature on retrospective economic voting in 
developed countries. See, for example, Gélineau (2013) for an analysis on the economic voting in 
developing countries. 
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voting share; in section 3, we present the results of our analysis on retrospective 
economic voting. Then, the conclusion follows. 
 
1. National Trends: Analysis of relative voting share from 1999 to 2014 
In this section, we review the national trends in electoral results using the 
relative vote share of parties (parties’ share of the valid vote). First, we define the term 
“Islamic parties,” and then review the changes in ruling parties from a historical 
standpoint. Finally, we examine the degree of the electoral volatility and the effective 
number of parties in Indonesia to show that both the volatility and the number of parties 
remain high, while the level of the vote share among Islamic parties has not changed and 
block volatility between Islamic parties and secular ones was not so high. This implies 
that although Indonesian voters often change their choice of party at the time of election, 
most of them basically support another party of the same religious cleavage as the one for 
which they voted in the previous election. 
 
1.1. Islamic Parties in Indonesia  
We define Islamic parties as parties explicitly claiming Islam as the basis of 
their party platform or parties that claim to be national parties but whose main 
constituents are Islamic organizations. In the post-democratization period, for example, 
the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan: PPP) and the Justice 
and Prosperous Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: PKS) explicitly claim that their party 
platform is based on Islam. On the other hand, the National Awakening Party (Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa: PKB) and the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional: 
PAN) officially claim that their party platform is based on Pancasila, the official state 
 5 
philosophy defining religious equality, but in reality most of their cadres and constituents 
are from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Muslim organization, and Muhammadiya, 
the second largest Muslim organization, respectively.
4
  
LSI (2008b) justifies our argument that it is reasonable to regard the PKB and 
the PAN, which officially claim to be Pancasila parties, as Islamic parties. The survey 
revealed that respondents who were asked, “Which parties are Islamic parties?” chose the 
PPP (78% of respondents), PKB (73%), PAN (65%), and PKS (57%), while only about 
30% of them answered the Golkar Party (Partai Golongan Karya), the Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan: PDIP), and the 
Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat) as Islamic parties. The same survey also showed that 
respondents who were questioned, “Which party is the most Islamic?” answered the PKS 
(20% of respondents), PKB (18%), PPP (13%), and PAN (5%). On the other hand, only 
2% to 3% of respondents answered that the above four parties are the most Pancasilatic 
party, instead picking Golkar (16.5%), PDIP (14%), and the Democratic Party (8%) as 
the most Pancasilatic parties. The survey results show that voters clearly differentiate 
between Islamic and secular parties and that they regard not only explicitly Islamic 
parties but also Islamic organization-based parties as Islamic parties.  
 
1.2. Ruling Parties from 1999 to 2014 
Table 1 reports that, since the democratization in 1998, the incumbent parties 
have never secured a position after elections. In the 1999 general elections, the PDIP led 
by independence leader Soekarno’s daughter, Megawati Soekarnoputri, defeated the 
Soeharto-era ruling party, Golkar, with 33.7% of the votes.  
                                                        
4
 For a list of all Islamic parties participating in the post-democratization elections, see Table A1. 
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=== Table 1 === 
 
However, in the second democratic elections of 2004 where the PDIP suffered 
a crushing defeat and Golkar returned to the top position, most of the existing parties, 
including these two, received a lower share of votes. On the other hand, newly 
established parties such as the Democrat Party or parties which have no direct links with 
old parties such as the PKS gained in popularity.  
In the next general elections of 2009, the Democrat Party won the first due to 
the high popularity of the incumbent President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The other 
existing parties excluding the PKS received a lower share of votes again, while new 
parties that were established by strong presidential candidates, such as the Great 
Indonesia Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya: Gerindra) led by the former 
Army Strategic Reserves (Kostrad) commander Prabowo Subianto, and the People’s 
Conscience Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat: Hanura) led by the former Indonesian 
National Armed Forces (TNI) commander Wiranto, successfully acquired parliamentary 
seats.  
In the most recent general elections in 2014, when Yudhoyono ended his 
10-year term just six months after the election, the ruling Democrat Party suffered heavy 
losses due to corruption charges against the party leaders. The PDIP regained the first 
winning party’s position with 19% of the votes, but their vote share fell far short of their 
expectations. On the other hand, Gerindra made a great advance to become the third 
largest party, and the National Democrat Party (Partai NasDem), which split from Golkar, 
secured 6.7% of the vote share.  
 7 
As shown in these four election results, the top winning party has never been 
the same. The composition of parties below the second-place winning party has changed 
drastically as well, mainly because newly established parties successfully acquired voters’ 
support at each election. Is this because “aliran politics” or traditional social cleavage 
was not effective anymore? Before answering this question, we discuss how electoral 
politics changed after democratization. 
 
1.3. Analysis of the National Level Data 
 
1.3.1. Electoral Volatility and the Effective Number of Parties 
The drastic changes in electoral results after democratization can be measured 
by the rate of electoral volatility, or the net electoral change in the party vote between two 
consecutive elections (Bartolini and Mair 1990).
5
 Table 1 shows that the total electoral 
volatility in the 2004 general elections recorded 23.0, then increased to 28.7 in 2009, and 
maintained its level in 2014 at 26.3.  
These numbers can be called high if compared with those of other democracies. 
The mean electoral volatility of Indonesia, at 26, is more than three times higher than 
those of thirteen European democracies between 1885 and 1985 (Bartolini and Mair 
1990), and more than two times higher than those of advanced industrial democracies 
today. It is comparable to the high electoral volatility of emerging democracies, i.e., 12.8 
in Southern Europe, 22.8 in India, South Korea, and Taiwan, 28.4 in Sub-Sahara Africa, 
30 in Latin America, and 44 in Eastern Europe (Hagopian 2007). 
Responding to the high electoral volatility, a number of newly established 
                                                        
5
 Following Pedersen (1979), we define electoral volatility as a variable derived from summing the 
absolute values of all gains and all losses of political parties divided by two. 
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political parties have competed in elections. “The new party boom” is not a mere 
temporal phenomenon of the post democratization period. Forty-eight parties competed 
in the 1999 general elections, and most of them, excluding Golkar and two other “official” 
opposition parties, the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia: PDI)
6
 
and the PPP, were new parties. Out of 24 parties participating in the 2004 elections, 11 
were new parties. In the 2009 general elections, newly established parties accounted for 
14 out of 38 participating parties. However, there was only one new party participating in 
the 2014 elections since the requirements for participation in elections were modified to 
restrict new ones from joining the competition.  
Those new parties not only participated in elections, but some of them 
successfully acquired parliamentary seats. The total number of parties that acquired 
parliamentary seats was 21 in 1999 and 16 in 2004. The number decreased to nine in 
2009 and 10 in 2014 since a parliamentary threshold was introduced to simplify the party 
system. It seems that the number of political parties has decreased since the 1999 general 
elections. However, if we look at the effective number of parties,
7
 the party system in 
Indonesia has been never simplified. As shown in Table 1, the electoral effective number 
of parties was 5.1 in 1999, 8.6 in 2004, 9.6 in 2009, and 8.9 in 2014. Thus, the effective 
number of parties at the electoral level gradually increased during the 10 years after 
democratization and still remained at a high level in 2014. Although the parliamentary 
threshold has been in place since 2009, the parliamentary effective number of parties has 
also continuously increased from 4.7 in 1999 to 7.1 in 2004, 6.1 in 2009, and 8.2 in 2014.  
The introduction of the direct presidential elections in 2004 further pushed 
                                                        
6
 Later in October 1998, Megawati’s faction divided the party to set up the PDIP. 
7
 According to Laakso and Taagepera (1979), the effective number of parties is defined as 1 divided 
by the sum of the squared decimal shares of the votes for each electoral party (electoral effective 
number) or seats won by each electoral party (parliamentary effective number). 
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forward “the new party boom.” The law on the presidential elections stipulates that a 
candidate who hopes to run in a presidential election has to be nominated by a party or a 
coalition of parties that have a certain share of parliamentary seats, that is, independent 
candidacy is prohibited. Thus, candidates who intend to run in a presidential election but 
have no strong support base in existing parties tend to establish their own parties. If their 
new parties succeed in securing enough votes to acquire parliamentary seats, they can 
have a chance to run in a presidential election. The first successful example of this was 
Yudhoyono’s Democrat Party. Its success was imitated by Prabowo’s Gerindra and 
Wiranto’s Hanura, both of which acquired parliamentary seats just after their 
establishment. 
 
1.3.2. Party Identification Lost 
What caused such large electoral volatility in Indonesian electoral politics after 
democratization? It seems that the high electoral volatility and the new party boom after 
democratization were mainly caused by voters’ loss of party identification. 
Several opinion surveys have shown that a majority of voters do not identify 
themselves with any political party in Indonesia. LSI (2008a) revealed that the percentage 
of party identifiers in Indonesia decreased from 49% to 15% during the five years 
between 2003 and 2008.
8
 A more recent survey shows that the percentage of party 
identifiers remained as low as 15% on average during the three years from 2011 to 2014 
(Indikator 2014). This figure is much lower than the mean percentage of party identifiers 
in emerging democracies, which is 34.7%, not to mention in advanced industrial 
democracies, at 47.5%. Rates of party identification in Indonesia are even lower than 
                                                        
8
 Party identification is measured by the percentage of those who answer positively to the question, 
“Do you feel close to any of the political parties?” 
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those of Asian countries, where less than one-quarter of voters expresses an attachment to 
a party (Hagopian 2007). Due to this weak partisanship, a majority of voters tend to cast 
their votes for different parties at each election. 
 
1.3.3. The End of Cleavage Voting? 
How did voters without party identification decide which party to vote for? 
Although political parties can be still categorized into two camps, secular and Islamic, 
religious issues have not been the central electoral agenda in the last four elections. None 
of Islamic parties has pushed for Islamization of the state, including the introduction of 
Islamic law (sharia) at the national level. Since no other politically sensitive, socially 
divisive issues exist, parties never appeal to the electorate with clear stances on policy 
agendas. Therefore, neither party identification nor policy issues have affected voting 
behavior since 1999. 
There has been an argument about whether aliran-style voting behavior can 
still be observed in parliamentary elections or not. Some literature argues that social 
cleavage cannot explain the voting behavior in the recent elections. Some researchers 
emphasize the effects of the socioeconomic modernization driven by high economic 
growth during the Soeharto era and the global revival of Islamic movements since the 
1980s on electoral attitudes of voters.
9
  
To examine whether religious cleavage voting, as used to be the case in “aliran 
politics,” is still applicable to Indonesia’s current elections, we first look at electoral 
volatility. As discussed above, the total scores of electoral volatility showed that voters’ 
                                                        
9
 For example, see Basyaib and Abidin (1999), Haris (2004), Liddle and Mujani (2007), and Mujani 
and Liddle (2010). In contrast, others argue that the aliran politics framework is still applicable to 
current Indonesian electoral politics. See, for example, Lanti (2001), Suryadinata (2002), King (2003), 
Turmudi (2004), Ananta et al. (2004), and Baswedan (2004). 
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behaviors have been unstable since democratization. However, if we look at the scores of 
block volatility between Islamic and secular voting to confirm the amount of swing votes 
from Islam to secular and vice versa, the block volatility was only 1.5 in the 2004 general 
elections, when the total volatility was as high as 23, as shown in Table 1. This means 
that 93.7% of voters swung only within Islamic or secular group. In 2009, when the total 
volatility increased to 26.6, block volatility also increased to 9.2, meaning 34.6% voted 
for parties belonging to another group. Although the 2009 results seemingly indicate the 
weakening of cleavage voting, block volatility in 2014 returned to as low as 2.0, and 
92.5% of voters swung within each group. From these electoral volatility scores, 
Indonesian voters’ behavior seems determined by the religious cleavage. 
Of interest, on the other hand, is that the vote share of all Islamic parties, in fact, 
has not changed significantly in the post-democratization elections. Table 1 shows that 
the vote share of all 20 Islamic parties in 1999 was 37.6%. In 2004, seven Islamic parties 
received 38.3% of votes. In 2009, the vote share of nine Islamic parties decreased to 
29.2%, and in 2014, the vote share of five Islamic parties maintained basically the same 
level, with 31.4%. Thus, around 30% to 40% of the electorate constantly vote for any of 
the Islamic parties. This relatively constant share of votes received by Islamic parties 
shows a possible relevancy of voting behavior based on religious cleavage between 
secularism and Islam in the current elections.  
  In this section, we make analysis using the national-level information. It can 
be argued that voters distinguish between secular and Islamic parties, and the religious, or 
Islamic, voters prefer to vote for Islamic parties. Although voters do not identify with any 
particular party, their behavior is determined by religiosity. Therefore, even if the party 
for which they vote changes from one election to another, those who voted for any 
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Islamic party in one election are likely to vote for some Islamic party at the next election. 
In the following section, we use district (kabupaten/kota) level data to test the hypothesis 
that religious cleavage influences voting behavior in Indonesia. 
 
2. Religious Cleavage 
We focus on analyzing the relative advantage of Islamic parties, especially in 
those districts where Islamic characteristics have been strongly observed. To measure the 
relative advantage of Islamic parties, we take the marginal vote share between the Islamic 
parties and the secular ones, that is, the Islamic parties’ absolute vote share, minus that of 
the secular parties.  
While in the above section we analyze the electoral results using relative 
voting share (the number of votes obtained over valid votes), hereafter we analyze voting 
behavior through absolute voting share, i.e., the number of votes obtained over the 
number of the electorate, at the district level in order to pay more attention to the share of 
abstention and invalid votes. 
 
2.1. Data and Summary Statistics 
Data on Indonesia’s DPR election results and socioeconomic characteristics, 
aggregated by districts from 1999 to 2014, are used in this section and the next. In order 
to make a panel dataset, the districts’ data are combined into 294 regional datasets on the 
basis of the 1996 administrative divisions because the district numbers have grown 
rapidly especially since the introduction of the decentralization law in 2001.
10
  
To measure the effects of regional Islamic characteristics on voting behavior, 
                                                        
10
 We have 497 districts for the 2014 DPR election data, 471 for the 2009 election, 440 for the 2004 
election, and 311 for the 1999 election. 
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we use the population share of Muslims which is derived from national population census 
results of 2000 and 2010 by BPS-Statistics Indonesia (BPS).  
For the 2004 and 2014 elections, we use the numbers of mosques (Masjid) per 
1,000 people at the district level from BPS’s Potential of Village Data (Potensi 
Desa/Kelurahan: Podes). We regard this information as a kind of index of regional 
Muslim piety. During the past 15 years, Podes surveys were conducted five times, and 
data was made available for the years 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, and 2011. So, we use the 
1999 results of Podes for the analysis of the 1999 election, the 2002 results for the 2004 
election, the 2008 results for the 2009 election, and the 2011 results for the latest election.  
Unfortunately, mainly due to lack of information on the number of abstention 
and the electorate in some regions, especially in Bali Province and Nusa Tenggara Timur 
Province in the 2009 election, we have to discard some observations. So, we have 495 
observations to use in the analysis of the elections in 1999 and 2009 as well as 1,070 
observations from all the elections to analyze religious cleavage in Indonesia.  
As shown in Table 2, the mean of the vote margin of Islamic parties was 
around -25%, and almost all (95% of samples) could be observed between 19% and 
-70% in the last four elections. During the 15 years, the number of Masjid per 1,000 
people was around 1 on average, and 2.9 at most. 
 
=== Table 2 === 
 
2.2. Comparison of Two Elections 
First, we compare the vote margin of Islamic parties in each election to see the 
trend of support for Islamic parties. In Figure 1, the vertical axis measures the Islamic 
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parties’ share minus the vote share of the secular parties in a DPR election, and the 
horizontal axis shows the same figures for the previous election five years before. If a 
district’s vote margin was the same as five years before, the results of the election are 
depicted right on the 45 degree line. Figure 1 tells us that (1) vote margins of Islamic 
parties remained almost the same in the two elections because points are basically 
concentrated along the 45 degree line, (2) the level of Islamic parties’ share was smaller 
than that of secular parties in most of the regions, and (3) some regions with a higher 
voting share received by Islamic parties in 2004 experienced a sharp drop in 2009 as 
points were below the 45 degree line.  
 
=== Figures 1, 2 and 3 === 
 
Next, we turn to check the changes in vote share for Islamic and secular parties 
in the two elections. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show that the vote shares of Islamic parties fell 
dramatically in 2009 compared with the results in 2004, while the vote shares of secular 
parties did not increase accordingly. The result indicates that the decrease in the vote 
shares of Islamic parties did not shift to cause an increase in vote shares of secular parties 
but possibly did cause an increase in abstention and/or invalid votes. To examine the 
relationship between vote shares of Islamic parties and the percentage of 
abstention/invalid votes, referred to hereinafter as Golput,
11
 we construct Figures 4 and 5. 
                                                        
11
 We could not obtain regional abstention vote numbers or invalid vote numbers for the 2004 
elections from KPU. This is why we have not analyzed the share of abstention and that of invalid votes 
respectively here. Golput is an abbreviation for Golongan Putih, a group of people who abstain from 
voting or cast blank votes. It was originally used at the time of the 1971 general elections held under 
Soeharto’s authoritarian regime when the anti-government movement led by student activists like Arief 
Budiman appealed to the people to abstain from elections or to cast a blank vote as a subtle expression 
of resistance against the government intervention in electoral process (Sanit 1992). Since then, Golput 
has implied voters’ expression of distrust, dissatisfaction, or disobedience against the government, 
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The two figures show that the amount of decrease in Islamic parties’ vote shares from 
2004 to 2009 was close to the increase in Golput shares (see Fig 4). On the other hand, 
the change in the secular parties’ vote share during the period was not explained by the 
decrease in the Islamic parties’ share, as shown in Fig 5. 
 
=== Figures 4 and 5 === 
 
Table 3 shows the relationship between vote shares of Islamic parties, secular 
parties and Golput. Districts are divided into five quantiles in accordance with the Islamic 
parties’ vote shares in 2004. The average vote share of Islamic parties in each quantile 
was from 15.2 % in the first quantile, 23.5 % in the second, 27.8 % in the third, 33.4 % in 
the fourth, and the 45.8 % in the fifth. As reported in columns (2) and (4), the higher the 
vote share of Islamic parties in 2004 was, the larger the decrease of Islamic parties’ share 
and the increase of Golput shares were from 2004 to 2009. On the other hand, the secular 
parties experienced a decline of their shares during the period, except for the fifth 
quantile which appears in column (6). These results seem to indicate that those who voted 
for Islamic parties in 2004 but stop supporting them in 2009 did not swing to secular 
parties but chose abstention (more precisely, Golput) under the assumption of no 
demographic change.  
 
=== Table 3 === 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
ruling parties, or politics in general. The usage in this chapter, however, does not have the political 
connotation of the original wording and simply means those who abstain or cast blank or invalid votes 
at the time of election. 
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How did those who abstained from the 2009 election behave in the 2014 
election? From the lines for 2009-2014 in Table 3, we can point out that the vote shares of 
Islamic parties as well as of secular parties increased in 2014, meaning that some of those 
who chose Golput in 2009 returned to vote in 2014. However, we have to note that vote 
shares of secular parties continued to increase in the regions of the fifth quantile, 
indicating the possibility that those who formerly voted for Islamic parties in 2004 swung 
to secular parties in 2014, especially in regions where support for Islamic parties was 
formerly strong.  
 
2.3. Vote Margin of Islamic Parties and Indicators of “Islamness” 
If religious cleavage exists, there is expected to be a positive correlation 
between vote margin and indicators of “Islamness” or Islamic piety. We would like to use 
the population share of Muslims and the number of Masjid per people as the indicators of 
Islamness. 
 
=== Figure 6 === 
 
Figure 6 plots the vote share margin of Islamic parties to secular ones against 
the population share of Muslims at the district level. The horizontal axis measures the 
odds ratio of the Muslims’ share in logarithms.12 As is apparent from the figure, the 
                                                        
12
 We use the 2000 national population census data for the 1999 elections results and the 2010 national 
population census data for the 2009 election results. We also note that, while there were regions where 
population share of Muslims was below  % in the latest population census, Muslims consisted of 90% 
of the population in most districts (278 districts, or 55.9%, in the 2010 population census). So, if we 
check the relation between the share of Muslims and the vote margin of Islamic-secular parties, it is 
difficult to see the correlation between them because almost half of the samples are scattered near the 
right-hand axis. Thus, here we use the logarithms of the odds ratio of the share of Muslims just for 
convenience. 
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difference in the vote shares of Islamic parties and the secular ones were larger if regions 
had a higher population share of Muslims in 1999 and 2009. This implies that regions 
with a higher population share of Muslims had a tendency to support Islamic parties.  
 
=== Figure 7 === 
 
We can confirm almost the same tendency in Figure 7 where the horizontal 
axis indicates the number of Masjid per 1000 people. The figure shows a positive 
correlation between the vote margin and the Masjid ratio. These two figures imply that 
the Islamic parties tend to have larger electoral support in regions where Islamic 
influences are strong if measured by the Muslim share and the Masjid ratio. So, next, we 
check the relation through simple regression models. 
 
=== Table 4 === 
 
Table 4 summarizes the linear regression models using a panel dataset. It 
shows that the population share of Muslims and the number of mosques per 1,000 people 
have a positive correlation with the vote margin of Islamic parties. This means that the 
Islamic parties tend to receive relatively stronger support from the electorate in regions 
with stronger Islamic social influences measured by the Muslim share and the mosque 
ratio. This result supports the hypothesis that religious cleavage still exists in Indonesia in 
the sense of the existence of a statistically significant positive correlation between those 
Islamic variables and the vote margin of Islamic parties. 
In sum, our analysis suggests that the vote share of Islamic parties has 
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remained constant at both the national and regional levels during the past 15 years. 
Islamic parties tend to receive strong support from voters in areas where Islamic social 
influences are strong. Supporters of Islamic parties rarely swing to secular parties but 
instead choose to abstain. Thus, although electoral volatility increased after 
democratization and the introduction of presidential elections changed the dynamics of 
electoral politics, religious cleavage still influences to a great extent electoral behavior in 
Indonesia. Even if voters change the party they support, their choices do not cross the 
border between secular and Islamic parties. Instead, they shift their support within the 
same religious cleavage. We therefore conclude that the electoral division between 
secular and Islamic voters could explain basic Indonesian electoral behavior.  
Our results seem to be consistent with Pepinsky et al. (2012). They argue that 
no advantage of Islamic parties over non-Islamic parties can be seen if the voters know 
the economic policy platforms of the parties. Indeed, there has been almost no election in 
which economic policies were the main campaign issues among the parties since the 
introduction of free and fair elections in 1999. 
If the voters in Indonesia tend to choose a party from the same religious camp, 
that is, basically consistently choose from the Islamic parties or the secular parties, then 
we should look for another reason why the electoral volatility was high in Indonesia. In 
the next section, we will discuss retrospective economic voting in Indonesia as one of the 
factors which cause voters to change support within each group. 
 
3. Retrospective Economic Voting 
In this section, we test the hypothesis of retrospective economic voting in 
Indonesia. As illustrated in section 1, in three of the four elections, the ruling parties at the 
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time of elections suffered a defeat, that is, the Golkar in 1999, the PDIP in 2004, and the 
Democrat Party in 2014. It is often explained that the Golkar’s defeat was due to its 
responsibility for mismanaging the country’s economy when it was hit by the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997/1998. The PDIP lost in 2004 mainly because the Megawati 
Administration was judged as having achieved little, especially in economic policy. 
During her administration, Indonesia experienced a growth rate of only 4.2% on 
average.
13
 On the other hand, the ruling Democrat Party suffered a defeat in 2014 even 
though that administration achieved relatively high performance in the realm of the 
economy. It is often pointed out that one of the reasons was the outgoing President 
Yudhoyono’s inability to prevent his party cadres from engaging in corruption. The only 
exceptional case was observed in the 2009 general elections when the President 
Yudhoyono’s ruling party won the first position. It seems that voters gave high marks in 
the election to his achievement of political stability and economic recovery. In the 
election, the Democrat Party became the first winning party to rise from fifth place in the 
previous election, while Golkar, which won first place in the previous election, slipped 
down to the second place.  
From anecdotal explanations about these electoral changes, we can 
hypothesize that Indonesian voters’ electoral behavior is affected by their assessment of 
the incumbent administration’s policy achievements, as has been the case in other 
democratic countries.  
 
                                                        
13
 This growth rate is the yearly average growth rate from fourth quarter of 1999 to third quarter of 
2004. So, correctly speaking, this figure must be described as the results of the Wahid and Megawati 
administrations. 
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3.1. Data 
To investigate the retrospective economic voting hypothesis, we employ a 
model with the vote margins of ruling parties to opposition parties at the time of general 
elections, i.e., the difference in vote shares between ruling parties
14
 and opposition 
parties, as the dependent variable and employ the growth rate of per capita of the gross 
regional domestic product (GRDP) as the independent variable. We include year 
dummies and regional dummies as control variables.
15
  
The data we use here is basically the same as that used in the previous section. 
We assume that the positive change in economic conditions caused voters to give more 
support to the ruling parties, when controlling for other factors. In order to test our 
hypothesis, in this section’s analysis, we use the exponential mean of per capita economic 
growth rate between the elections as the economic condition variable.
16
  
We construct the per capita economic growth as follows. First, for the 
economic growth data, we calculate the exponential mean of the growth rate using GRDP 
without oil and gas. However, as of the end of 2014, the gross regional domestic product 
data for the year 2014 were not available. So, we utilize the growth rate between 2009 
and 2012 as if the growth rate had not changed until 2014. If we compare the average 
national economic growth rate from 2009 to 2012 with that of 2009 to 2014, the latter is 
lower than the former. This means that the estimation results to be tested for the effect on 
                                                        
14
 For a list of all ruling parties at the time of elections, see Table A2.  
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 The basic regression model we employ is as follows: 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑅
𝐸𝑖,𝑡
−
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑂
𝐸𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡 + 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡   
where i: district, t: year, 𝑃𝑅 : the number of votes for ruling parties at the time of election, 𝑃𝑂: the 
number of votes for opposition parties, 𝐸: the number of the electorate, 𝑥: the growth rate of per 
capita GRDP (exponential mean of last five years), 𝜖: error terms.  
16
 Healy and Lenz (2014) pointed out that voting behavior of the electorate was affected most by the 
election-year economy because that information was more easily available (“end-heuristic”).  
However, we just take the 5-year (or 3-year) mean growth rate as the economic variable in this paper 
because the economic data for the year 2014 is not available at the time of this writing.   
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2014 election could be underestimated. Second, we use the number of the electorate 
instead of the estimated population for each region to calculate the exponential mean of 
population growth rate because we think the growth rate of the number of the electorate 
reflected more precisely the real growth rate of the population between the elections.
17
 
Due to this limitation, we must pay attention to the evaluation of the results later. 
Needless to say, our analysis remains a temporal one. 
 
=== Table 5 === 
 
Table 5 shows the summary statistics. In Sample 1, we use whole sample, 
while we excluded those samples that lack some information like an abstention record. In 
Sample 2, we did not include observations if the per capita GRDP growth rate were not 
within four standard deviation of the mean.
18
 When comparing Sample 1 with Sample 2, 
we find that samples such as districts with per capita economic growth of 46.8% and 
-47.4% on average are not included any longer in Sample 2. The sample sizes are 840 
and 833 respectively. 
As shown in Table 5, the vote margin of the ruling parties declined gradually, 
from 12.8% to 6.2% in Sample 1, and from 13% to 6.2% in Sample 2. On the other hand, 
with the decline of the vote margin, the average growth rate of the per capita GRDP rose 
higher, from -0.3% to 3.8% in Sample 1, and from 0.1% to 3.8% in Sample 2. Thus, the 
simple correlation between the vote margin of the ruling parties and the growth rate of the 
                                                        
17
 In short, basically we calculate (ln 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 −  ln 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−5)/5 − (ln 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 −  ln 𝐸𝑖,𝑡−5)/5, where Y is the GRDP 
without oil and gas, though for the year 2014, we calculate (ln 𝑌𝑖,2012 −  ln 𝑌𝑖,2009)/3 − (ln 𝐸𝑖,2014 −
  ln 𝐸𝑖,2009)/5. 
18
 Theoretically speaking, 99.9937% of the observations fall within four standard deviation of the 
mean. 
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per capita GRDP seems to be negative.  
 
3.2. Tentative Results 
Table 6 shows the results of our estimation. All models, from (1) to (8), show 
that the increases in the growth rates of per capita GRDP are significantly associated with 
a larger difference between the ruling parties’ share and the opposition parties’ share. 
Figure 8 illustrates the relation using the results in (6) and (8). 
 
=== Table 6 and Figure 8 === 
 
First, if we limit the sample to only during the time of 2004 and 2009 elections, 
a 1 percentage increase in the per capita GRDP growth rate produces a 0.5 to 1.5 
percentage-point increase in the ruling parties’ share relative to the share of the opposition 
parties. If we include samples from the 2014 election, the coefficients decrease. They are 
almost the same, around 0.5, if in Sample 1, while they decrease more in Sample 2 as 
from 0.7 to 0.5, and from 1.5 to 0.8. This decrease of the coefficients must be partly 
caused by the variable we use. As we have already mentioned, the national average 
growth rate of GDP from 2009 to 2012 was 6.32%, though the economic growth rate 
from 2009 to 2014 was 5.97%. So, the results of our estimation including the sample of 
the 2014 election might be underestimated.  
Next, if we check the coefficients of the year dummy of 2009, the dummy 
variable indicates that ruling parties lost around 5 percentage points in vote share in the 
2014 election when compared with opposition parties. In the summary statistics, we see 
the 5 percentage-point decrease of the vote margin of ruling parties over opposition 
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parties in 2014 when compared with the results of the 2009 election. According to our 
estimation, this decrease was explained as the result of a year-specific negative shock 
which was observed in all districts. We think that this is because of the negative public 
evaluation of the ruling parties, especially the Democrat Party, following a series of 
corruption cases that came to light in which the party executives including the 
chairperson were successively arrested. This negative evaluation of political performance 
caused the party to lose its share of the vote. It is pointed out, however, that the party’s 
loss was much smaller than expected before the election. We argue that the moderate loss 
of the Democrat Party in 2014 can be partly explained by voters who positively evaluated 
the ruling parties’ economic performance.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine voting behavior in the DPR elections from 1999 to 
2014. When Indonesia was democratized in 1998, there was an argument that the fierce 
party competition of the 1950s would return and “aliran politics” would be revived in 
elections. After observing 15 years of electoral politics, we find that the argument is 
partly wrong and partly correct. Electoral volatility in the past 15-year period is much 
more than is assumed. This may indicate that “aliran politics” has disappeared due to the 
drastic change in electoral politics since democratization. So, in order to analyze the 
continuity and change in Indonesia’s electoral politics, we investigated the voting 
behavior with simple regression models and provide three results. First, we clarified that 
districts which formerly stood strongly behind Islamic parties continued to select those 
parties, or gave preference to abstention over the secular parties in the 2009 election. 
Second, we analyzed the effect of regional characteristics on the vote margin of Islamic 
 24 
parties, using aggregated panel data at the district level, and confirmed the positive 
correlations between them. Third, from the analysis of retrospective economic voting, we 
found that districts which experienced higher per capita economic growth gave more 
support to the ruling parties; a one-time shock in an election year, such as the negative 
evaluation of the Democrat Party in 2014, also had a large effect on the degree of support 
given to the ruling parties.  
With these results, we conclude that religious cleavage still affects voting 
behavior in Indonesia in the sense that there is a statistically significant correlation 
between the regional religious character and the margin of the vote share of Islamic 
parties versus secular parties. This means that voters basically tend to choose the same 
camp as they did in the preceding elections, though retrospective economic voting caused 
them to decide which party to select within the camp.  
Our analysis seems to be consistent with the argument that in the absence of 
strong party identities, voters decide their electoral choice on the basis of retrospective 
evaluations of government performance (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). However, 
according to Hagopian (2007), electoral volatility will diminish with the continuity of 
economic growth, if voters are primarily retrospectively evaluating government 
performance. Contrary to this theoretical view, a diminishing trend in electoral volatility 
has not been confirmed in spite of the Yudhoyono government’s higher economic growth 
during his 10-year term.  
Finally, we should note that the results of our analysis about the retrospective 
economic voting on the 2014 election are still tentative. Further analysis must wait until 
the full dataset is available. 
 
 25 
References 
 
Ananta, Aris, Evi Nurvidya Arifin, and Leo Suryadinata. Indonesian Electoral 
Behaviour: A Statistical Perspective. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2004. 
Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS). Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000 
[Indonesian population: The result of the 2000 Population Census]. Jakarta: 
Badan Pusat Statistik, 2001. 
------. Produk Domestik Regional Bruto Kabupaten/Kota di Indonesia 1998-2001 [Gross 
regional domestic product of regencies/municipalities in Indonesia 1998-2001]. 
Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2003. 
------. Produk Domestik Regional Bruto Kabupaten/Kota di Indonesia 2002-2006 [Gross 
regional domestic product of regencies/municipalities in Indonesia 2002-2006]. 
Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2007. 
------. Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2010 [Indonesian population: 
The result of the 2010 Population Census]. Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2011. 
------. Produk Domestik Regional Bruto Kabupaten/Kota di Indonesia 2008-2012 [Gross 
regional dmestic product of regencies/municipalities in Indonesia 2008-2012]. 
Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2013. 
Bartolini, Stefano and Peter Mair. Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability: The 
Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990. 
Baswedan, Anies Rasyid. “Sirkulasi Suara dalam Pemilu 2004” [Circulation of votes in 
the 2004 general elections]. Analisis CSIS, 33(2), 2004: pp. 173-89. 
Basyaib, Hamid, and Hamid Abidin, eds. Mengapa Partai Islam Kalah? Perjalanan 
Politik Islam dari Prapemilu '99 sampai Pemilihan Presiden [Why did Islamic 
parties loose?: Political journey of Islam from the pre-1999 election until 
presidential election]. Jakarta: Alvabet, 1999. 
Converse, Philip E. “Of Time and Partisan Stability”. Comparative Political Studies, 2(2), 
1969: pp. 139-171. 
Esmer, Yilmaz, and Thorleif Pettersson. “The Effects of Religion and Religiosity on 
 26 
Voting Behavior”. In The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior, edited by 
Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007: pp. 481–503. 
Feith, Herbert. The Indonesian Elections of 1955. Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program, 
Cornell University, 1957. 
Gélineau, François. “Electoral Accountability in the Developing World”. Electoral 
Studies, 32, 2013: pp.418-424. 
Hagopian, Frances. “Parties and Voters in Emerging Democracies”. In The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Politics, edited by Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2007: pp. 582–603. 
Haris, Syamsuddin. “Politicization of Religion and the Failure of Islamic Parties in the 
1999 General Election”. In Elections in Indonesia: The New Order and Beyond, 
edited by Hans Antlov and Sven Cederroth, London: Routledge, 2004: pp. 61–
76.  
Healy, Andrew, and Gabriel S, Lenz. “Substituting the End for the Whole: Why Voters 
Respond Primarily to the Election-Year Economy”. American Journal of 
Political Science, 58(1), 2014: pp.31-47. 
Indikator. Efek Kampanye dan Efek Jokowi: Elektabilitas Partai Jelang Pemilu Legislatif 
2014 [Effects of campaign and effects of Jokowi: Electability of parties toward 
2014 legislative general election]. Jakarta: Indikator, 2014. 
King, Dwight Y. Half-hearted Reform: Electoral Institutions and the Struggle for 
Democracy in Indonesia. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003. 
Laakso, M. and R. Taagepera. “Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application 
to West Europe”. Comparative Political Studies, 12(1), 1979: pp. 3-27. 
Lanti, Irman. G. Back to the (Slightly Different) Future: Continuity and Change in 
Indonesian Politics. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001. 
Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI). Kecenderungan Swing Voter Menjelang Pemilu 
Legislatif 2009 [Trends of swing voters toward the 2009 legislative general 
election]. Jakarta: Lembaga Survei Indonesia, 2008a. 
------. Kekuatan Elektoral Partai-Partai Islam Menjelang Pemilu 2009 [Electoral 
strength of Islamic parties toward the 2009 legislative election]. Jakarta: 
 27 
Lembaga Survei Indonesia, 2008b. 
Lewis-Beck, Michael and Mary Stegmaier. “Economic Determinants of Electoral 
Outcomes”. Annual Review of Political Science, 3, 2007: pp. 183-219. 
Liddle, R. William and Saiful Mujani. “Leadership, Party, and Religion: Explaining 
Voting Behavior in Indonesia”. Comparative Political Studies, 40(7), 2007: pp. 
832-57. 
Mainwaring, Scott, and M. Torcal. “Party System Institutionalization and Party System 
Theory after the Third Wave Democratization”. In Handbook of Political 
Parties, edited by R.S. Katz and W. Crotty, London: Sage, 2006: pp. 204-227. 
Mujani, Saiful and R. William Liddle. “Parsonalities, Parties, and Voters”. Journal of 
Democracy, 21(2), 2010: pp. 35–49. 
Pedersen, Mogens N. “The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of 
Electoral Volatility”. European Journal of Political Research, 7(1), 1979: pp. 1–
26. 
Pepinski, Thomas B., R. William Liddle, and Saiful Mujani. “Testing Islam’s Political 
Advantage: Evidence from Indonesia”. American Journal of Political Science, 
56(3), 2012: pp.584-600. 
Sanit, Arbi, ed. Golput: Analisa Pandangan Fenomena Politik [Golput: Philosophical 
analysis of political phenomena]. Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1992. 
Suryadinata, Leo. Elections and Politics in Indonesia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2002. 
Turmudi, Endang. “Patronage, Aliran and Islamic Ideologies during elections in Jombang, 
East Java”. In Elections in Indonesia: The New Order and Beyond, edited by 
Hans Antlov and Sven Cederroth, London: Routledge Curzon, 2004. 
 
 
=== Tables A.1 and A.2 === 
 
 
  
 28 
Figure 1. Vote Margin of Islamic Parties (1999-2014) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on KPU data. 
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Figure 2. Vote Share of Islamic Parties (1999-2014) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on KPU data. 
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Figure 3. Vote Share of Secular Parties (1999-2014) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on KPU data. 
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Figure 4. Change in Vote Share of Islamic Parties and Golput (2004 - 2009) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on KPU data. 
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Figure 5. Change in Vote Share of Secular Parties and Golput (2004 - 2009) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on KPU data. 
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Figure 6. Vote Margin of Islamic Parties and Population Share of Muslims (1999 - 2009)  
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on KPU data and BPS (2001, 2011). 
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Figure7. Vote Margin of Islamic Parties and Number of Masjid per 1000 people (1999-2009) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on KPU data and Podes. 
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Figure 8. Vote Margin of Ruling Parties and Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP (2004-2014) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on KPU data and BPS (2003, 2007, 2013). 
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Table 1. Election Results after Democratization 
 
Note: The figures in italics indicate the first winning party in each election. 
Source: Authors' calculation based on KPU data. 
  
1999-2004 2004-2009 2009-2014 2014-2019 
Vote Share Seat Share Vote Share Seat Share Vote Share Seat Share Vote Share Seat Share
PDIP 33.7% 30.6% 18.5% 19.8% 14.0% 16.8% 19.0% 19.5%
Golkar 22.4% 24.0% 21.6% 23.1% 14.5% 18.9% 14.8% 16.3%
PD --- --- 7.5% 10.2% 20.9% 26.4% 10.2% 10.9%
Gerindra --- --- --- --- 4.5% 4.6% 11.8% 13.0%
Hanura --- --- --- --- 3.8% 3.0% 5.3% 2.9%
NasDem --- --- --- --- --- --- 6.7% 6.3%
PPP 7.1% 6.8% 8.2% 10.6% 5.3% 6.8% 6.5% 7.0%
PKB 12.6% 10.2% 10.6% 9.5% 7.9% 5.0% 9.0% 8.4%
PAN 7.1% 6.8% 6.4% 9.6% 6.0% 8.2% 7.6% 8.8%
PKS 1.4% 1.4% 7.3% 8.2% 7.9% 10.2% 6.8% 7.1%
Others 9.1% 8.4% 16.1% 9.1% 15.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Secular Parties Total 62.4% 62.8% 61.7% 57.6% 70.8% 69.8% 68.6% 68.8%
Islamic Parties Total 37.6% 37.2% 38.3% 42.6% 29.2% 30.2% 31.4% 31.3%
Effective Number of Parties
(Electoral and Legislative) 5.1 4.7 8.6 7.1 6.1 6.2 8.9 8.2
Volatility
Total Volatility 23.0 26.6 26.3
Total Volatility Without Others 20.1 20.7 19.0
Block Volatility 1.5 9.2 2.0
Within Block Volatility (TV-BV） 21.5 17.4 24.4
Share of WBV in TV 93.7% 65.4% 92.5%
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Table 2. Summary Statistics: Religious Cleavage Voting (1999-2014) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on KPU data, BPS (2001, 2011) and Podes data. 
  
Variables Obs Mean
Standard
Deviation Min Max
Vote Margin of Islamic Parties (%) 495 -26.20 23.85 -92.92 55.84
Population Share of Muslims (%) 495 84.45 25.37 1.43 99.93
Number of Masjid (per 1000 people) 495 0.987 0.534 0.008 2.617
Vote Margin of Islamic Parties (%) 1,070 -25.21 22.19 -92.92 57.08
Number of Masjid (per 1000 people) 1070 0.992 0.554 0.004 2.903
1999 & 2009
1999-2014
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Table 3. Summary Statistics: Religious Cleavage Voting (1999-2014) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on KPU data. 
 
  
Islamic Parties' Share
in 2004 2004-2009 2009-2014 2004-2009 2009-2014 2004-2009 2009-2014
1st 15.2 -1.9 2.8 9.9 -4.9 -8.0 2.1
2nd 23.5 -6.7 3.5 11.3 -2.7 -4.6 -0.8
3rd 27.8 -10.1 2.9 15.4 -4.8 -5.3 1.9
4th 33.4 -12.5 2.0 15.3 -3.8 -2.8 1.8
5th 45.8 -21.5 1.7 17.9 -7.1 3.6 5.3
⊿Islam ⊿Golput ⊿Secular
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Table 4. Results: Religious Cleavage Voting (1999-2014) 
 
Note: Huber robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** significant 
at 5%, and *** significant at 1 %. 
Source: Authors' calculation based on KPU data, BPS (2001, 2011) and Podes data. 
 
 
  
Population Share 0.617 *** 2.377 ** 2.082 **
  of Muslims (%) (0.032) (0.993) (0.970)
Number of Masjid 41.517 *** 10.224 *** 19.578 ***
  (per 1000 people) (11.717) (1.187) (5.736)
Year Dummy
Regional Dummy
  F statistics for fixed effect 1.705 *** 1.729 *** 8.223 ***
Adjusted R
2
Sample Size
0.615 0.070
(5)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1999-20141999 & 2009
No Yes Yes No
0.689
495 495 495 1,070 1,070
0.427 0.593
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Table 5. Summary Statistics: Vote Margin of Ruling Parties and Growth Rate of Per 
Capita GDP (2004-2014) 
 
Source: Authors' calculation based on KPU data and BPS (2003, 2007, 2013). 
 
  
Year Obs Mean
Standard
Deviation Min Max
2004 283 12.83 16.80 -34.86 60.78
2009 265 10.66 14.35 -26.86 57.94
2014 292 6.22 14.79 -32.86 49.71
2004 283 -0.26 4.57 -47.39 19.43
2009 265 3.00 3.86 -12.34 46.81
2014 292 3.77 2.21 -12.19 17.04
2004 278 13.03 16.82 -34.86 60.78
2009 263 10.55 14.29 -26.86 57.94
2014 292 6.22 14.79 -32.86 49.71
2004 278 0.09 2.42 -8.91 14.81
2009 263 2.77 2.55 -12.34 12.48
2014 292 3.77 2.21 -12.19 17.04
Sample 1
Sample 2
Vote Margin of Ruling Parties (%)
Growth Rate of per capita GDP (%)
Vote Margin of Ruling Parties (%)
Growth Rate of per capita GDP (%)
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Table 6. Results: Economic Voting 
 
Note: Huber robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** significant 
at 5%, and *** significant at 1 %. 
Source: Authors' calculation based on KPU data and BPS (2003, 2007, 2013).  
 
 
  
Growth Rate 0.502 *** 0.609 * 0.444 *** 0.480 *** 0.733 *** 1.484 *** 0.526 ** 0.783 ***
  of per capita GDP (0.149) (0.336) (0.130) (0.178) (0.280) (0.481) (0.222) (0.293)
Year 2004 3.803 *** 2.914 * 8.402 *** 8.488 *** 4.450 *** 5.560 *** 8.755 *** 9.710 ***
(1.389) (1.550) (1.563) (1.409) (1.496) (1.956) (1.563) (1.688)
Year 2009 4.787 *** 4.897 *** 4.858 5.141 ***
(1.245) (1.069) (1.270) (1.095)
Constant 9.154
***
9.472
***
4.540
***
4.399
***
8.518
***
6.903
***
4.231
***
3.252
**
(0.962) (1.264) (1.018) (1.044) (1.163) (1.684) (1.249) (1.391)
Regional Dummy
  F statistics for fixed effect 1.774
***
1.814
***
1.921
***
1.825
***
Adjusted R2
Sample Size
2004-2009
Sample 1 Sample 2
2004-2009 2004-20142004-2014
No Yes
(1) (2)
No Yes
(3) (4)
No
(5) (6) (7) (8)
0.023
548
0.308
No Yes
548
Yes
0.020 0.344 0.040 0.254
541 541 833 833
0.043 0.253
840 840
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Table A1. Islamic and Secular Parties 
 
Note: Arrows indicate the same party; however, parties which were established through mergers of small parties are excluded. 
Source: Authors.  
1999 2004 2009 2014
Islam Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) → Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) → Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) → Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) → Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) → Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) → Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)
Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) → Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) → Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) → Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)
Partai Keadilan (PK) → Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) → Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) → Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)
Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB) → Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB) → Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB) → Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)
Partai Nahdlatul Ummat (PNU) → Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia (Partai PNUI) → Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia (Partai PNUI)
Partai Indonesia Baru (PIB) Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR) → Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR)
Partai Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia (KAMI) Partai Matahari Bangsa (PMB)
Partai Ummat Islam (PUI) Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama (PKNU)
Partai Kebangkitan Umat (PKU)
Partai Masyumi Baru
Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII)
Partai Abul Yatama (PAY)
Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia 1905 (PSII-1905)
Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi (PPIM)
Partai Islam Demokrat (PID)
Partai Persatuan (PP)
Partai Cinta Damai 
Partai Solidaritas Uni Nasional Indonesia (Suni)
Partai Ummat Muslimin Indonesia (PUMI)
Secular Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar) → Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar) → Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar) → Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP) → Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP) → Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP) → Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)
Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (PKP) → Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (PKP Indonesia) → Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (PKP Indonesia) → Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (PKP Indonesia)
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) → Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia (Partai PDI) → Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia (Partai PDI) Partai NasDem
Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI-Supeni) → Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme (PNI Marhaenisme) → Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme (PNI Marhaenisme)
Partai Kristen Nasional Indonesia (KRISNA) Partai Demokrat → Partai Demokrat → Partai Demokrat
Partai Aliansi Demokrat Indonesia IPADI) Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa (Partai KPB) → Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa (PKPB)
Partai Kebangsaan Merdeka (PKM) Partai Pelopor → Partai Pelopor
Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (PDKB) Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS) → Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS)
Partai Rakyat Demokratik (PRD) Partai Patriot Pancasila → Partai Patriot
Partai Pilihan Rakyat (Pilar) Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat (PBSD) → Partai Buruh
Partai Rakyat Indonesia (Pari) Partai Merdeka → Partai Merdeka
Partai Solidaritas Pekerja (PSP) Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan (Partai PDK) Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura) → Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura)
Partai Nasional Indonesia-Front Marhaenis (PNI-Front Marhaenis) Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru (Partai PIB) Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra) → Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra)
Partai Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI) Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan (PNBK) Partai Pengusaha dan Pekerja Indonesia (PPPI)
Partai Republik Partai Sarikat Indonesia (PSI) Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional (PPRN)
Partai Nasional Indonesia-Massa Marhaen (PNI-Massa Marhraen) Partai Persatuan Daerah (PPD) Partai Barisan Nasional (PBN)
Partai Katolik Demokrat (PKD) Partai Kasih Demokrasi Indonesia (PKD Indonesia)
Partai Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak (Murba) Partai Perjuangan Indonesia Baru (Partai PIB)
Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia (PUDI) Partai Kedaulatan
Partai Buruh Nasional (PBN) Partai Persatuan Daerah (PPD)
Partai Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong (MKGR) Partai Pemuda Indonesia (PPI)
Partai Daulat Rakyat (PDR) Partai Demokrasi Pembaruan (PDP)
Partai Solidaritas Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (PSPSI) Partai Karya Perjuangan (PKP)
Partai Nasional Bangsa Indonesia (PNBI) Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan (PDK)
Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia (PBI) Partai Republik Nusantara (RepublikaN)
Partai Nasional Demokrat (PND) Partai Nasional Benteng Kerakyatan Indonesia (PNBK Indonesia)
Partai Pekerja Indonesia (PPI) Partai Indonesia Sejahtera (PIS)
Partai Sarikat Indonesia (PSI)
 43 
Table A2. Ruling Parties 
 
Notes: (1) From the Habibie to the Megawati administrations, the percentages of the ruling coalition parties' seats have been calculated, 
including those of the military/police faction since the said faction participated in these administrations. 
(2) PKPI, which participated in Joko Widodo's coalition in the 2014 presidential election, failed to acquire parliamentary seats since its 
vote share didn't surpass the parliamentary threshold of 3.5% in the parliamentary elections. 
(3) * indicates a president's party, and ** indicates a vice-President's party. 
Source: Authors.            
President B.J. Habibie Abdurrahman Wahid Megawati Sukarnoputri
1st Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono
2nd Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono
Joko Widodo
Period
20 May 1998-
19 Oct. 1999
20 Oct. 1999-
22 July 2001
23 July 2001-
19 Oct. 2004
20 Oct. 2004-
19 Oct. 2009
20 Oct. 2009-
19 Oct. 2014
20 Oct. 2014-
19 Oct. 2019
Parliamentary Seats of Ruling Parties
% of a Ruling Party* 65.0% 10.2% 30.6% 10.2% 26.8% 19.5%
% of President's* & Vice-President's** Parties --- 40.8% 42.2% 33.3% 26.8% 19.5%
% of Ruling Coalition Parties
1) 97.8% 94.8% 83.2% 63.8% 75.5% 43.9%
Number of Coalition Parties 2 Parties & 1 Faction 7 Parties & 1 Faction 5 Parties and 1 Faction 7 Parties 6 Parties 5 Parties
Compositions of Coalition Parties Golkar* PKB* PDIP* PD* PD* PDIP*
PPP PDIP** PPP** Golkar** PKS PKB
Military/Police Golkar PBB PKS PAN NasDem
PAN PAN PAN PPP Hanura
PPP Golkar PBB PKB PPP
PBB Military/Police PKPI Golkar (PKPI)
2)
PK PPP
Military/Police
